Is Britain more connected to the global economy — or less?

MATCH OF THE DAY: ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION — Europe 3, Britain 1

Referee: KOF Swiss Economic Institute

Brexit’s sales pitch was not that Britain would be less connected, but more. Liam Fox called the referendum result “the beginning of Britain increasing its global engagement” and said Britain was ready for “an open, liberal and competitive globalised trading environment.” 

The KOF Swiss Economic Institute's economic globalisation index measures two things: the actual cross-border flows of trade and finance, and the restrictions that stand in their way. That makes it a direct test of the Brexit promise. 

According to KOF’s own definition, Brexit did not make Britain more economically globalised. It left Britain more dependent on financial openness while weakening the trade side of the score.

WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

Britain starts 1st in 2012, is still 1st in 2019, briefly returns to 1st in 2022, then slips to 3rd in 2023 and 4th by 2026, behind Germany, France and the EU average, with only Italy below. 

The UK’s economic globalisation score is 81.24, behind Germany on 82.47 and only narrowly above France on 80.86, while Italy is on 73.63. KOF had already warned that Brexit was “likely to have had an adverse impact on economic globalisation.” 

So the problem is simple. Britain promised a more global economy, but on KOF’s test the country became less trade-integrated where it mattered most, while its continental peers stayed plugged into a bigger market. 

3 REASONS why Britain lost this match

1) PLAN — a slogan is not a route-map

The Brexit promise was global reach. But the actual plan was thin: leave the deepest market Britain had, then hope thinner free-trade deals elsewhere would compensate. Under KOF’s method, trade agreements matter, but so do tariffs, non-tariff barriers, compliance costs and capital restrictions. Britain had a political slogan before it had a funded mechanism; the EU, Germany and France already had one in the single market. The plan was not expansion first, friction later. It was friction first, adjustment later. That is not a game plan. It is a punt upfield. 

Plan score: UK 3/10, EU 8/10 — Britain had ambition without mechanism.

2) POLICY — more paperwork, less openness

The policy reality was harsher than the promise. The Office for Budget Responsibility says the post-Brexit settlement will cut long-run UK productivity by 4% relative to staying in the EU, largely because non-tariff barriers now obstruct comparative advantage, while uncertainty hit investment before the deal even arrived. UK in a Changing Europe cites evidence that Brexit cut UK goods trade by about 13%, with broader assumptions consistent with a 15% hit to trade intensity. On KOF’s own sub-scores, that is the heart of the problem: in 2023 Britain’s trade-globalisation score was only 72.21, while its financial-globalisation score was 90.27. Britain did not become more globally open; it became more lopsided.

Policy score: UK 3/10, EU 7/10 — the policy mix raised frictions where KOF counts them.

3) PERFORMANCE — the continent kept the passing game

The working European model is institutional depth. Germany stayed above Britain in 2023, and France and the EU also finish above Britain by the end of the run. Their edge is not mystical. It is that they remained inside a system built to keep trade in goods, services, capital and rules moving with less friction. KOF’s index rewards that kind of embedded openness. Britain, by contrast, tried to replace thick integration with thinner external reach. The result was not a red-card collapse. It was a slow loss of midfield control. 

Performance score: UK 4/10, EU 7/10 — Europe kept the machinery; Britain kept the rhetoric.

FINAL WHISTLE — what this score really means

Britain’s problem on economic globalisation is that Brexit swapped deep market access for shallower autonomy, and KOF scores the cost of that swap. 

Germany, France and the wider EU system kept the pipes open. Britain chose to re-erect frictions with its biggest market, then asked finance, diplomacy and optimism to cover the gap. Finance helped. It did not fully save the score.

Starmer now inherits that scoreboard. If he wants a more economically globalised Britain can he reduce the trade barriers, uncertainty and underpowered market access that still drag on the UK? If not, Britain stays what it has become: internationally visible, financially open, but economically less connected than the promise said it would be.

SEE WHERE BRITAIN REALLY STANDS